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[I]t is an established fact that documents justifying and authorizing
the abusive treatment ofdetainees during interrogation were approved
and distributed .... [T]his policy demonstrates that this war has
tested more than our nation's ability to defend itself. It has tested our
response to our fears and the measure of our courage. It has tested
our commitment to our most fundamental values and our
constitutional principles.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Immediately after the attacks on the United States of September 11,2001,
President George W. Bush authorized the National Security Agency to
undertake electronic surveillance in violation of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act.2 This was only the first step of an expansive set of claims for
the President to act on his own authority to respond to the "war on terror,"
without regard to whether Congress or the courts would approve or support
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1. Alberto J. Mora, AnAffront to American Values, WASH. POST, May 27, 2006, at A25. Mr. Mora
retired as Navy General Counsel in 2005.
2. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006); 50
U.S.C. §§ 1801-11 (2000) (electronic surveillance); id. at §§ 1821-29 (physical searches); id. at §§ 1841-46
(pen registers and similar devices); id at §§ 1861-62 (access to business records); id at § 1871 (annual
reports to Congress). For the President's authorization of surveillance, see James Risen &. Eric Lichtblau,
Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,2005, at Al. See also James Bamford,
The Nation: Private Lives; The Agency That Could Be Big Brother, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2005, at sec. 4,
pg. 1; Dan Eggan, Bush Authorized Domestic Spying: Post-9/11 Order Bypassed Special Court, WASH.
POST, Dec. 16,2005, at Al; Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Domestic Surveillance: SpyAgencyMineda Vast
Data Trove, Officials Report, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2005, at Al.
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these decisions. The President claimed, among other powers, the power to
launch preemptive wars on his own authority3 (although in actuality he sought
and obtained authorization to use military force from the Congress'); the power
to disregard the laws of war pertaining to occupied lands;5 and the power to
define the status and treatment of persons detained as "enemy combatants" in
the war on terror.6
These claims were not an accident. Vice-President Cheney stated publicly,
more than once, that these steps were part of a plan to restore the Presidency to
"the proper scope" of its powers even more than a means to defend the nation.'
3. National Security Council, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 15
(Sept. 17,2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html (last visited November 1, 2006). See
also George W. Bush, Commencement Speech at the U.S. Military Academy, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Docs. 944, 946 (June 10, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/print/
200206010-3 (last visited November 1, 2006). For a recent reaffirmation of this policy, see Peter Baker,
Bush to Restate Terror Strategy: 2002 Doctrine of Preemptive War to Be Reaffirmed, WASH. POST, Mar.
16,2006, at Al; David E. Sanger, Report Backs Iraq Strike and Cites Iran Peril, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16,2006,
at A6. See also Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, The President's Constitutional Authority to Conduct
Military Operations against Terrorist Organizations and the Nations that Harbor or Support Them, 25
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 487 (2002); sean D. Murphy, The Doctrine ofPreemptive Self-Defense, 50 VILL.
L. REv. 685 (2005).
4. Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
(hereinafter"Authorization I"); Authorization of the Use of Military Force against Iraq, Pub. L. No. 107-243,
116 Stat. 1498 (2002) (hereinafter "Authorization IV').
5. See U.S.-U.K. Letter to the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2003/53 8 (May 8, 2003) (indicating
that the two nations "will strictly abide by their obligations under international law including those relating
to the essential humanitarian needs of the people of Iraq"). See David Glazier, Ignorance Is Not Bliss: The
Law of Belligerent Occupation and the US. Invasion of Iraq, 58 RUTGERS L. REv. 121, 189-90 (2005);
Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 97,
154-63 (2004).
6. Military Order No. 1: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
against Terrorism, 66 FED. REG. 57, 833 (Nov. 13, 2001). See also Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen.,
Memorandum to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002) ("Bybee Memorandum"),
available at http://washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/012202bybee.pdf (last visited Nov. 18,
2006); Jay S. Bybee, Memorandum to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and to William J. Haynes,
General Counsel, Dep't of Def. (Jan. 22, 2002), available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB127/02.01.22.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2006); Donald Rumsfeld, Memorandum of the Secretary
of Defense to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Status of Taliban and al-Qaeda, Jan. 19, 2002, available at
http://lawofwar.org/Rumsfeld%2OTorture%2Omemo 0001 .jpg (last visited Nov. 18, 2006); John Yoo, Deputy
Ass't Att'y Gen., & Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, Memorandum to William J. Haynes, II, General
Counsel, Dep't of Def. (Jan. 9, 2002), available at http://www.slate.com/features/whatistorture/pdfs/
020109.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2006).
7. Peter Baker & Jim VandeHei, Clash Is Latest Chapter in Bush Effort to Widen Executive
Power, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2005, at Al; David E. Sanger & Eric Schmitt, Cheney's Power No Longer
Goes Unquestioned, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2006, at 1; Richard W. Stevenson & Adam Liptak, Cheney
Defends Eavesdropping without Warrants, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21,2005, at A36; Jim VandeHei, Cheney Says
NSA Spying Should Be an Election Issue, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 2006, at A7.
Dellapenna
Michael Ramsey has delineated the extent to which the lawyers in the Office
of Legal Counsel of the Department Justice claimed unilateral authority on
behalf of the President when the claims were unnecessary for the specific
policies for which they were invoked 8-a pattern suggestive of a goal of
aggrandizing Presidential authority beyond the defense of the nation. This
pattern disregards the fact that the President's duty is to enforce the law, not to
break it.9
Questions of Presidential authority are important. The framers of the
Constitution expected the separation of powers to be the primary protection for
liberty." They therefore set about to structure each branch's power in ways
that allow each to block the other. The framers expected the three branches to
contend with each other, and in contending to prevent any single branch from
dominating." The framers were prescient-the three branches have contended
with each other in shifting balances throughout our history. Yet the recent
Presidential claims of unilateral authority in effect would smother the other two
branches. 2 Space does not allow a full analysis of the powers of the several
branches. This article considers whether the claims of unilateral Presidential
authority can be sustained in light of constitutional text and tradition.13
II. THE POWERS GRANTED THE PRESIDENT
The grant of powers to the President in Article II of Constitution is short
but impressive. First, Article II vests "the executive Power" in the President.'
4
Article II then provides that the President: serves as commander-in-chief of the
armed forces; 1" supervises the executive branch, with the obligation to see that
the laws are faithfully executed;' 6 has the power to grant pardons for offenses
8. See Michael D. Ramsey, Torturing Executive Power, 93 GEO. L.J. 1213, 1225-36 (2005).
9. Jinks & Sloss, supra note 5, at 123-24.
10. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 267 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McLellan eds.,
2001). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122-23 (1976).
11. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 401 (Alexander Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 249 (James
Madison). See also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).
12. Sanger & Schmitt, supra note 7 (quoting Senator Lindsey Graham, R-SC).
13. Bush 's "Signing'" Bonus: He Issues Himself an Out on Torture, NEWSDAY, Jan. 8, 2006, at
A32; David Sarasohn, Presidential Powers: Congress Writes a Law, Then President Rereads It, THE
OREGONIAN, Jan. 4, 2006, at B8; Tortured Language: President Bush Signs a Statement that Indicates
Prisoner Abuse Might Well Continue, ALB. TIMES UN., Jan. 16, 2006, at A6. On signing statements
generally, see AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS,
RECOMMENDATION (2006) available at http://www.abanet.org/op/signingstatements/aba-final-signing_
statements_ recommendation-report_7-24-06.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2006).
14. U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 1.
15. Id. at art. I, § 2 (1).
16. Id. at art. H, §§ 2(I), 3.
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against the United States; 7 has .the power to make treaties; appoints
ambassadors, judges, and officers of the United States; 9 has the power, on
occasion, to control the meeting times of Congress; 0 and is to receive
ambassadors. 21 These powers, if granted fully and exclusively to the President,
would vest in him nearly complete control over the government.
Yet none of the specific powers, except perhaps the power to pardon and
the limited power over the meetings of the Congress, are vested exclusively in
the President. Congress has the power to provide for the common defense, 22 to
declare war,23 and to provide for and regulate the military.24 Congress even was
given the power to grant letters of marque and reprisal 25-which arguably gives
Congress responsibility for undeclared as well as declared wars.26 Moreover,
Congress has the power to make, and the courts to construe, the laws the
President is faithfully to execute.27 Three Presidential powers establish his
authority over the conduct of foreign relations, but two of those (the power to
appoint ambassadors and to make treaties) require the advice and consent of the
Senate (and for treaties, consent must be by a two-thirds majority).28 Thus the
description of the President as the "sole organ" in the conduct of foreign affairs
is something of an exaggeration.29 Presidential authority to make other
appointments also requires the advice and consent of the Senate.3" As for the
powers to pardon and to control emergency meetings of Congress, while not
expressly limited in the text of the Constitution, there is the "necessary and
proper clause": "The Congress shall have Power... To make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,
17. Id, at art. l, § 2.
18. Id. at art. I, § 2(2).
19. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2(2), (3).
20. Id. at art. l.
21. Id.
22. Id. at art. I, § 8(1).
23. Id. at art. I, § 8(11).
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8(11)-(16).
25. Id. at art. I, § 8(11).
26. Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1 (1801); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37 (1800). See Curtis A. Bradley &
Jack L. Goldsmith, CongressionalAuthorization andthe War on Terror, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047,2072-78
(2005).
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; Id. at art. II, § 2(1).
28. Id. at art. I, § 2(2).
29. U.S. v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp., 229 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). See H. JEFFERSON POWELL,
THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS: AN ESSAY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
(2002); ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: THE ORIGINS (1976);
Louis Fisher, A Constitutional Structure for Foreign Affairs, 19 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 1059 (2003).
30. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2(2).
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and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or officer thereof."'"
Today we are confronted by arguments about a "unitary executive" that,
in its more extreme manifestations, claims that the powers vested in the
President by the Constitution are exclusive and plenary-without limitation by
the other branches of the government, at least during wars or similar crises.32
Such arguments fly in the face the text of the Constitution.3 Some supporters
of the strong executive power argue that the specific grants of powers to the
President are illustrative of an unrestrained grant of "executive Power," rather
than as an exhaustive listing of what the "executive Power" comprises.34 This
argument is not credible. Why would the Framers have bothered to list specific
powers, including "some trifling ones, 35 if the "vesting clause" swept
everything conceivable within its purview? Nor does this theory find support
in the history of the various clauses.36 The Federalist Papers, for example,
viewed the commander-in-chief power as simply the power to command troops
in the field37 and to repel sudden attacks38-not "as the power to do whatever
31. Id. at art. I, § 8(18). See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). Some refer to the
"necessary and proper" clause as the "Sweeping Clause" because it sweeps a broad and undefined power into
the hands of Congress. See Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause,
6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183 (2003); Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal
Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1993).
32. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,580-83 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting); JOHNYOo,THE
POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005); Norman C.
Bay, Executive Power and the War on Terror, 83 U. DENV. L. REV. 335 (2005); Saikrishna B. Prakash,
Foreign Affairs andtheJeffersonian Executive: A Defense, 89 MINN. L. REv. 1591 (2005). A narrower view
of the theory of a "unitary executive" simply asserts that all executive officers and agencies are answerable
to the President for the discharge of their duties, without regard to the power of the President apart from his
control the executive branch. See Douglas W. Kmiec, OLC's Opinion Writing Function: The Legal Adhesive
for a Unitary Executive, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 67 (2005); Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of
the Administrative State: The Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963 (2001).
33. Reid Skibell, Separation-of-Powers and the Commander in Chief.- Congress's Authority to
Override Presidential Decisions, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 183, 201-02 (2004).
34. Compare Steven G. Calabresi & Siakrishna B. Prakash The President's Power to Execute the
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994) (arguing that the "vesting clause" vests a broad executive power beyond the
specific grants delineated in Article 1I) with Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the
Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994) (arguing that the "executive Power" must be read as referring
to the specific powers granted in Article II).
35. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,641 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
36. Skibell, supra note 33, at 197-205, 208-18; Jeremy Telman, A Truism That Isn't True? The
Tenth Amendment and Executive Power, 51 CATH. U.L. REV. 135, 153-78 (2001).
37. THE FEDERALIST No.69, at 355 (Alexander Hamilton).
38. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 318-19 (Max Farrand ed., 1937). See
Jeffrey D. Jackson, Note, The Dog of War as a Puppy: The Constitutional Power to Initiate Hostilities as
Answered by the Framing, I GEO. J.L & PUB. POL'Y 361, 368 (2003); Telman, supra note 36, at 149-53.
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it takes to win the war., 39 And consider the federalism concerns if the "inherent
power" of the President derives from sources outside the Constitution.4°
III. THE POWERS TAKEN BY THE PRESIDENT
Supporters of the "unitary executive" base their claims both on their
perception of the necessities of the modem situation and on an extravagant
reading of the history of the Presidential powers.41 I do not argue whether an
enlarged executive power is necessary as a matter of policy. My concern is
narrower and more technical: Is the President authorized to implement the far-
reaching powers he has decided upon on his own authority, or must he seek
Congressional authorization, except as a temporary reaction to an emergency?
Much of this debate turns upon an examination of the historical practice of the
office of the President as undertaken by successive Presidents and as Congress
and the courts have responded those practices. While persistent institutional
impropriety cannot make an unconstitutional practice constitutional,"
institutional practices can inform us what authoritative interpreters of the
Constitution regarded as its meaning, particularly when closer in time to the
drafting of the language in question.43
Over time there has been an accretion of power in the White House, albeit
with conflicts and setbacks along the way. Struggle over the powers of the
three branches began with the Constitutional Convention in 1787 and has
continued ever since. The problem arises because the framers did not clearly
indicate where Presidential authority stopped and the authority of the other
branches began. Given their theory that the protection of liberty arose from the
clash of the three branches, " the framers apparently created this confusion
39. Oral Argument of Paul D. Clement on Behalf of Petitioner, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 2004 WL
1066129, at *22 (U.S. Apr. 22, 2004) (comment by Scalia, J.).
40. Would this mean that the Tenth Amendment-with its admonition that powers not delegated
to the federal government in the Constitution are reserved to the states or to the people-is a dead letter?; see
also Telman, supra note 36, at 140-46. Does the Tenth Amendment, in order to protect the prerogatives of
the States and the people, necessarily protect the prerogatives of the Congress and the courts vis-6-vis the
executive branch? Id. at 146-79.
41. See YOO, supra note 32; John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The
Original Understanding of the War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167 (1996); John C. Yoo, War and the
Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHi. L. REV. 1639 (2002).
42. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
43. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) ("[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress
and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution,
making as it were such exercise of power part of the structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss
on 'executive Power' vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.").
44. Madison, supra note 10. See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122-23 (1976).
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deliberately. The first serious controversy over the President's authority to
conduct foreign relations arose with President Washington's Proclamation of
Neutrality5 calling upon Americans to refrain from taking sides in the conflicts
arising from the French Revolution. The proclamation led to an unsuccessful
prosecution of an American merchant seaman for cooperating with a French
privateer" and sparked a debate between Alexander Hamilton (writing as
"Pacificus") and James Madison (writing as "Helvidius") over Presidential
authority.47 Hamilton argued that the Constitution vested in the President an
inherent executive authority that included every aspect of traditional executive
(royal) authority not expressly granted to Congress." Yet if the "vesting
clause" granting the executive power to the President were so broad, the further
listing of specific powers conferred on the President was superfluous. The
argument also ignores the "necessary and proper" clause.49 The debate was too
indecisive to resolve the scope of the President's power.5"
For truly broad assertions of Presidential powers independently of, or even
in defiance of, Congress or the courts, we must turn to the Civil War.5
President Lincoln undertook to exercise the broadest range of "prerogative
power" ever claimed by a President.52 Faced with attacks on federal facilities
45. Proclamation of Neutrality (Apr. 22, 1793), reprinted in 32 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON 430-31 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939).
46. J. KENDALL FEW, TRIAL By JURY 289-97 (1993) (recounting the course of the trial and the
jury's refusal to convict despite a charge from the court that virtually directed a verdict of guilty).
47. The "Pacificus/Helividius" essays, reprinted in 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 63-78
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lemer eds., 1987).
48. For modem arguments in favor ofthis reading of Article I1, see YoO, supra note 32; John Yoo,
Review Essay: Politics as Law? The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of Powers, and Treaty
Interpretation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 851, 896-901 (2001). For a careful refutation of Hamilton's claims, see
Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 545 (2004).
49. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. For an argument against such a broad reading of the necessary
and proper clause, see Saikrishna Prakash, Regulation of Presidential Powers, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 215,
225-57 (2005). See generally Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power:
A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1993).
50. Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 48, at 679-87.
51. David Currie has concluded that at least before 1840, every President acted consistently with
the terms of the War Powers Resolution of 1973: "The President may introduce troops into hostilities only
pursuant to a congressional declaration of war or other legislative authorization, or in response to an attack
on the United States." David P. Currie, Rumors of War: Presidential and Congressional War Powers,
1809-1829,67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1 (2000). See also Telman, supra note 36, at 159-65. Washington himself
declined to commit troops against Indian tribes without Congressional authorization. See also SOFAER,
supra note 29, at 120-27.
52. MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, PRESIDENTIAL POWER, SECRECY, AND
ACCOUNTABILITY 36 (2003). Rozell defines "prerogative power" as an executive power "to act according to
discretion for the public good, without the prescription of the law and sometimes even against it."
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in the South and with the newly elected Congress not yet convened, he
undertook dramatic action to suppress the rebellion,53 calling the militias of the
loyal states into federal service and for 75,000 volunteers, suspending habeas
corpus (first in Maryland and gradually throughout the country), proclaiming
a blockade of the Southern ports, directing the Treasury Department to expend
$2,000,000 raised through New York financiers in support of the war effort,
and ordering civilians to be tried by military commissions for crimes in support
of the Confederacy. None of these actions were authorized by statute, yet it
was in Congress, not the President, that the Constitution vested authority to take
such decisions. 4 If Lincoln had waited for Congress to convene to vote the
necessary measures, however, the war might have been lost before it began."
When Congress finally convened, Lincoln reported his actions to Congress and
asked it to approve his actions. 6 While he argued for the legality of his actions,
he also requested Congress to ratify the decisions, with at least an implicit
admission that the decisions could not stand after Congress was in session
unless Congress did approve them-as Congress eventually did.57
The suspension of habeas corpus was the trickiest problem because Chief
Justice Roger Taney issued two writs directing the release of persons
imprisoned in Fort McHenry in Baltimore on suspicion of sabotaging telegraph
lines and bridges.5 The state courts in Maryland were open and operating but
President Lincoln was unwilling to trust Maryland juries and declined to
comply with Taney's order.59 Lincoln's message to Congress came close to
53. See generallyDANIELFARBER, LINCOLN'SCONSTITUTION 13-17, 115-95 (2003); HAROLD M.
HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1835-1875
214-15,238-41 (1982); MARK E. NEELY, THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
3-18, 32, 51-53 (1991); GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME: FROM THE
SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERROR 79-134 (2004).
54. U.S. CONST. art. i, § 8(1 1) ("Congress shall have Power... To declare War"); id. at § 8(15)
("Congress shall have Power... To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the laws of the Union.");
Id. at § 9(2) ("The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public safety may require it."); id. at § 9(7) ("No Money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in consequence of Appropriations made by law.").
55. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 15-25 (1998).
56. Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in 4 COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 430 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) [hereinafter Lincoln's Special Message]. See
FARBER, supra note 53, at 132-43.
57. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1863); see FARBER, supra note 53, at 138-43.
58. Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861). See also FARBER, supra note 53, at
188-92; HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 53, at 239-41; NEELY, supra note 53, at 8-10; Norman Spaulding,
The Discourse of Law in the Time of War: Politics and Professionalism during the Civil War and
Reconstruction, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2001, 2061-67 (2005).
59. HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 53, at 241; REHNQUIST, supra note 55, at 33-35.
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conceding the illegality of his defiance. 60 Lincoln argued that he had to choose
between his general obligation to see that the laws are faithfully enforced and
the specific obligation to respect habeas corpus. He also argued that because
of the emergency, his claim of authority to act pending the meeting of Congress
was a small implication from the constitutional design. 6' Lincoln argued,
The whole of the laws which were required to be faithfully executed
were... failing of execution, in nearly one-third of the states. Must
they be allowed to finally fail of execution, even had it been perfectly
clear that by the use of the means necessary to their execution some
single law, made in such extreme tenderness of the citizen's liberty,
that, practically, it relieves more of the guilty than the innocent,
should, to a very limited extent, be violated? To state the question
more directly: are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the
govemment to go to pieces, lest that one be violated? Even in such
a case, would not the official oath be broken, if the government
should be overthrown when it was believed that disregarding the
single law would tend to preserve it?62
The problem with arguments based on necessity is that claims of necessity
can mask a host of sins, and what might seem necessary in the heat of the
moment can be embarrassing or worse in hindsight.63 The rule of law is
supposed to prevent such embarrassments. Perhaps this is why Lincoln
followed the argument from necessity with a claim that he was not violating the
law-leaving the Attorney General to fill in the details.' And it is why the
Supreme Court, in calmer times, reminded us that: "[e]mergency does not
create power. Emergency does not increase granted power, or diminish the
restrictions imposed upon power granted. 65
After Lincoln's defiance of Chief Justice Taney, the courts backed away
from confronting the President.66 Lincoln's most famous action solely on the
basis of his authority as commander-in-chief was the Emancipation
60. Lincoln's Special Message, supra note 56.
61. Id.; see FARBER, supra note 53, at 160-63.
62. Lincoln's Special Message, supra note 56.
63. Consider the later congressional apology for the internment of Japanese Americans during
World War II. The Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (codified in 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1989 to 1989d). See also Peter Green, The King Is Dead, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 29, 1997, at 36, 39
("What stirs our blood may end up embarrassing our conscience.").
64. Lincoln's Special Message, supra note 56; see 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 87 (1861).
65. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 425 (1934).
66. See Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. 243 (1863). REHNQUIST, supra note 55, at 135-37;
Spaulding, supra note 58, at 2004-11; Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, SuP. CT. REv. 47 (2004).
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Proclamation, an executive order issued on September 22, 1862,67 which was
ratified by an amendment to the Constitution. 68 After the war, the Supreme
Court decided that suspension of habeas corpus when civilian courts are open
and operating is unconstitutional,69 only to see Congress promptly revoke the
Court's authority to hear appeals in habeas corpus cases.70 But the precedent
stands.
Legal conclusions about the inherent powers of the President from
Lincoln's actions are less than clear. Congress, for the most part in fairly short
order, ratified his actions. In the two instances in which the judiciary challeng-
ed the legality of the President's actions, Congress supported the President
against the Supreme Court. Congressional ratification of the President's actions
was enough to end the matter.
Woodrow Wilson was the next President to assert broad powers, parti-
cularly after the United States entered World War I. He relied on a compliant
Congress to authorize the extraordinary actions he considered necessary to the
war effort.7 He declined to issue an executive order authorizing military courts
to try civilians interfering in the war effort.72 Yet he took some actions entirely
on his own authority. Rather dramatically, he issued an executive order seizing
all railroads in the country, ordering them to be operated by a federal
administrator,73 and established the Food Administration, the Grain Corpora-
tion, and the World Trade Board by executive order.74
Franklin Delano Roosevelt made extensive use of executive orders in
fighting the Depression, some of which orders were highly controversial.75 And
67. Proclamation No. 17, 12 Stat. 1268 (1863).
68. U.S. CONST. amend. XI1.
69. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 124-25 (1866).
70. Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868).
71. See The Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (1918) (making it a crime to "willfully
utter, print, write, or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language" about the United States
and excluding from the mails any material advocating "treason, insurrection or resistance to any law of the
U.S."); The Sedition Act of 1918, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553 (1918) (punishing criticism of the war or the
government, including any form of language intended to cause contempt or scorn for our form of government,
the Constitution, or the flag). See generally NEELY, supra note 53, at 181; REHNQUIST, supra note 55, at
178-83; STONE, supra note 53, at 135-234.
72. SANFORD J. UNGER, FBI 41-42 (1976). Wilson deferred to the Supreme Court's decision in
Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 124-25 (holding that military courts could not try civilians when civilian courts
are open and functioning).
73. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. North Dakota, 250 U.S. 135 (1919) (upholding the seizure of the
railroads).
74. See John A. Sterling, Above the Law: Evolution of Executive Orders (Part One), 31 UWLA
L. REv. 99, 103 (2000).
75. See generally Tara L. Branum, President or King? The Use andAbuse of Executive Orders in
Modern Day America, 28 J. LEGIS. 1 (2002).
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during World War II, he issued numerous executive orders. The most notorious
was Executive Order no. 9066,76 authorizing the "exclusion" persons of
Japanese ancestry from the west coast states-meaning their confinement in
concentration camps." Congress shortly thereafter ratified Executive Order no.
9066 by enacting a law making it a misdemeanor to violate the order.7" Because
of this statute, the Supreme Court upheld Executive Order no. 9066 repeated-
ly.79 Forty-six years later, Congress enacted a formal apology to the Japanese
and Japanese-Americans who had been interned and provided a modest
payment ($20,000 per person) as reparations for the wrong done to them. °
President Roosevelt also ordered military commissions to try persons
arrested in the United States "for offenses against the laws of war and the
Articles of War."8' Eight Nazi saboteurs (including one American citizen) were
arrested and brought before a military commission. 2 The Supreme Court
reviewed the lower court's denial of the writ of habeas corpus,3 but concluded
that Congress had authorized trial by military commission for violations of the
(international) laws of war and the Articles of War.84 The Court insisted that
it had no authority to review whether the defendants were guilty or innocent,
but only whether their constitutional rights had been violated;85 thereafter six
of the eight defendants were executed, including the one American citizen. Yet
only four years later, in reviewing a writ of habeas corpus for Japanese General
76. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 9, 1942).
77. See generally REHNQUIST, supra note 55, at 186-91; STONE, supra note 53, at 255-310; ERIC
K. YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT
(2001).
78. Pub. L. No. 77-503, 56 Stat. 173 (1942).
79. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943);
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). All three convictions would be vacated some 40 years later
because ofprosecutorial misconduct. Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987); Yasui v.
United States, 772 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir. 1985); Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal.
1984). The Supreme Court also held, on the same day that it decided Korematsu, that detainees who could
establish that they were loyal must be released. Exparte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
80. The Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (codified in 50 U.S.C. §§
1989 to 1989d).
81. Proclamation No. 2561, 7 Fed. Reg. 5101 (July 2, 1942).
82. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). The would-be saboteurs were already in custody when the
executive orders were issued, having been arrested by the FBI. See LOUIS FISHER, NAZI SABOTEURS ON
TRIAL: A MILITARY TRIBUNAL AND AMERICAN LAW 12 (2003). For an argument that these men, or at least
the American among them, should have been tried in civilian courts as traitors, see Carlton F.W. Larson, The
Forgotten Constitutional Law Treason and the Enemy Combatant Problem, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 863,
894-900 (2006).
83. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25-26.
84. Id. at 25-30.
85. Id. at 25.
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Tomoyuki Yamashita, who was tried before a U.S. military commission in the
Philippines, the Court did in fact examine the guilt or innocence of the
defendant.86
During the Korean War, President Truman ordered the seizure of the steel
mills in 1951 to prevent a strike that would have impeded the manufacturing of
military equipment and munitions.8 7 The majority in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer88 held that the executive order was not a military act and
therefore not within the President's authority as commander-in-chief;89 nor
could the order be justified under the duty of the President to see that laws are
faithfully executed, for he was not enforcing an act of Congress or a command
of the Constitution but was making his own law.9° The case is better known,
however, for Justice Robert Jackson's concurring opinion-an opinion that has
since been endorsed by a majority of the Court.91 Jackson described an
interpretive continuum according to which a President's actions must be
judged. Jackson's analysis provides a template for analyzing the actions of the
current President:
The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and
cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its
branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn from
context. While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure
liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed
powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches
separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity. Pre-
sidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their
disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress....
1) When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for
it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that
Congress can delegate. In these circumstances, and in these
only, may he be said.., to personify the federal sovereignty.
If his act is held unconstitutional under these circumstances, it
usually means that the Federal Government as an undivided
whole lacks power. A seizure executed by the President
pursuant to an Act of Congress would be supported by the
strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial
86. See generally In re Yamshita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
87. Exec. Order No. 10,340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3139 (April 10, 1952).
88. See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
89. Id. at 587.
90. Id. at 587-89.
91. Dames & Moore v. Reagan, 453 U.S. 668, 668-69 (1981).
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interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily
upon any who might attack it.
2) When the President acts in absence of either a congressional
grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own
independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he
and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its
distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia,
indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical
matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presiden-
tial responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely
to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary
imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.
3) When the President takes measures incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest
ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional
powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the
matter. Courts can sustain exclusive Presidential control in such
a case only be disabling the Congress from acting upon the
subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and
preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake
is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.92
Presidential exercises of unilateral authority did not end with Youngstown
Sheet and Tube, but Presidents thereafter tended to involve Congress in their
more controversial actions. In Vietnam, the Presidents did not claim sweeping
authority independently of Congress, although they came to be accused of
abusing the powers conferred by Congress9 3 and of lying to Congress to obtain
authorization for the war.94 Unity between the political branches did not hold.
Congress repealed the authorization in 19719' and took steps to bar continuation
of the War.96 Congress also enacted legislation to limit the exercise of presi-
dential authority as commander-in-chief(the War Powers Resolution of 197397)
and to assure judicial and congressional oversight of intelligence gathering
within and without the United States (the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act98). Presidents have never been happy with these restraints, consistently
92. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-40, 653 (Jackson, J., concurring).
93. See generally STONE, supra note 53, at 427-526.
94. See Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Pub. L. No. 88-408,78 Stat. 384 (1964); JOHN HARTELY, WAR
AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 19-20 (1993).
95. Pub. L. No. 91-672, 84 Stat. 2055 (1971).
96. See THOMAS M. FRANCK & EDWARD WEISBAND, FOREIGN POLICY BY CONGRESS 13-33 (1979).
97. War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. § 1541-1548 (2000).
98. Foreign Intelligence Survelliance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801-1871 (2000).
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insisting that they are not bound by them," yet Presidents have complied with
them."° President Bush's report to Congress on the actions taken to respond to
the 9/11 attacks exhibits the typical Presidential posture: compliance with the
War Powers Resolution's procedures while insisting that he is not bound by it:
In response to these attacks on our territory, our citizens, and our way
of life, I, ordered the deployment of various combat-equipped and
combat support forces to a number of foreign nations in the Central
and Pacific Command areas of operations .... I have taken these
actions pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct U.S.
foreign relations and as Commander-in-Chiefand ChiefExecutive. 0 '
IV. PRESIDENT BUSH REACTS TO 9/11
The scale and success of the attacks on September 11, as well as the evi-
dence that it was a part of an ongoing, organized global campaign, perhaps
made it inevitable that the Bush administration would treat the situation as a
war rather than as individual criminal conduct. 10 2 President Bush the younger
declared a "War on Terror"'0 3 and then proceeded in the name of that war to
take a number of unprecedented steps to secure the nation. Congress endorsed
the War by approving resolutions authorizing the use of force against terrorists
and in Iraq,"° by enacting the USA PATRIOT Act,"0 5 and by creating the
99. See STEPHEN DYcUS, ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 302-26 (3d ed. 2002); Louis FISHER,
PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 123-28 (2d ed. 2004). See generally ELY, supra note 94.
100. See RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION;31297;31297: AFTER THIRTY
YEARS (Cong. Research Serv., CRS Report for Congress Order Code RL 32267, Mar. 11, 2004), available
at http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32267.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2006).
101. PRESIDENT's LETTER TO CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS REPORTING ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF
FORCES IN RESPONSE TO THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11,2 PUB. PAPERS 1157, 1157 (Sept. 24,
2001).
102. See Bay, supra note 32, at 353-71; Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights,
National Security Law andthe Law ofArmed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675,715-25
(2004). See generally Derek Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2003).
103. PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS BEFORE A JOINT SESSION OF THE CONGRESS ON THE UNITED STATES IN
RESPONSETO THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11,37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1347, 1348 (Sept.
20, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/print/20010920-8.html (last
visited Nov. 18, 2006).
104. Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001); Auth-
orization of the Use of Military Force against Iraq, Pub. L. no. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002). For analyses of
these authorizations, see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26; Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, Rejoinder: The
War on Terrorism: International Law, Clear Statement Requirements, and Constitutional Design, 118 HARV.
L. REv. 2683 (2005); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Replies to Congressional Authorization: International
Law, US. War Powers, and the Global War on Terrorism, 118 HARv. L. REv. 2653 (2005).
105. USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of
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Department of Homeland Security. 116 Yet, even with these broad powers in
hand, the President claimed powers that no prior President had ever claimed:
to launch preemptive wars; to establish rules contrary to the recognized laws of
war; and to conduct surveillance in violation of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act. 1
07
The President made these claims on the basis of his alleged authority under
the Constitution, powers that allegedly were beyond the power of Congress to
regulate, restrict, or control. Many of the decisions were taken in secret.'
This may have been because the Bush administration engaged in systematic
violations of the laws of war,'0 9 laws defined in a series of conventions signed
U.S.C.). See generally AMrrAI ETZIONI, How PATRIOTIC IS THE PATRIOT ACT?. (2004); Thomas V. Burch,
"Doublethink"ing Privacy under the Multi-state Antiterrorism Information Exchange, 29 SETON HALL LEGIS.
J. 147 (2004); Robert N. Davis, Striking the Balance: National Security vs. Civil Liberties, 29 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 175 (2003); Jules Lobel, The War on Terrorism and Civil Liberties, 63 U. PITr. L. REV. 767 (2002); Steven
A. Osher, Privacy, Computers and the Patriot Act: The Fourth Amendment Isn't Dead, But No One Will Insure
It, 54 FLA. L. REv. 521 (2002); Natsu Taylor Saito, Whose Liberty? Whose Security? The USA PA TRIOTAct in
the Context of Coinelpro and the Unlawful Repression of Political Dissent, 81 OR. L. REv. 1051 (2002).
106. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. no. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified in various
sections of 6 U.S.C.).
107. See the authorities collected supra at notes 2-6.
108. The Bush administration seemed to be obsessed with secrecy even when not related to the war
on terror. See, e.g., Cheney v. District Ct., 542 U.S. 367 (2004). See also Dan Eggan, White House Trains
Efforts on Media Leaks: Sources, Reporters CouldBe Prosecuted, WASH. POST, Mar. 5,2006, at Al; Walter
Pincus, Press Can Be Prosecuted for Having Secret Files, US. Says, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2006, at A3;
Andrew C. Revkin, Call for Openness at NASA Adds to Reports of Pressure, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16,2006, at
A20; Scott Shane, Universities Say New Rules Could Hurt U.S. Research, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2005, at
All; Ellen Smith, Mining for Truth about Sago, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2006, at A23; TORE CLARKE,
LIPSTICK ON A PIG: WINNING IN THE No-SPIN ERA BY SOMEONE WHO KNOWS THE GAME (2006). The
administration's obsession with secrecy reached its apogee with the efforts of several national security
agencies to withdraw and reclassify documents in the National Archives-documents that in many cases had
already been published, and therefore will remain public despite the reclassification project. See Christopher
Lee, Archives Pledges to End Secret Agreements, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 2006, at A4; Christopher Lee,
Archives Kept a Secrecy Secret: Agencies Remove Declassified Papers from Public Access, WASH. POST,
Apr. 12, 2006, at A6; Scott Shane, National Archives Pact Let C.IA. Withdraw Public Documents, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 18,2006, at A16; Scott Shane, National Archives Says Records Were Wrongly Classified, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 27, 2006, at A24.
109. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, War and Enemy Status after 9/11: Attacks on the Laws of War, 28
YALE J. INT'L L. 325 (2003); Gabor Rona, Interesting Times for International Humanitarian Law:
Challenges from the "War on Terror ", 27 FLETCHER FOREIGN WORLD AFFAIRS 55 (2003); William H. Taft
IV, The Law ofArmed Conflict after 9/11: Some Salient Features, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 319 (2003). For less
critical views of the Bush administration's actions, see Brooks, supra note 102; Derek Jinks, The Changing
Laws of War: Do WeNeeda NewLegal Regime after September 11?, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1493 (2004);
Kenneth Roth, The Law of War in the War on Terror, 83 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, no. 1, at 2 (Jan.-Feb. 2004).
See generally EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION (2d ed. 2004); INGRID DETrER,
THE LAW OF WAR (2d ed. 2002); LESLIE C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (2d ed.
2000).
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and ratified by the United States."' Traditionally, the United States had taken
the lead in creating and enforcing these laws,"' in our national courts" 2 as well
as through international organizations" 3 and tribunals."l 4 While the United
States is no longer a leader regarding these rules,"15 it did not withdraw its rati-
fications of the basic documents, nor has it altered its statutes pertaining to the
laws of war. On paper, at least, we are still fully committed to the laws of war.
The violations of the laws of war eventually became public-particularly
the abuse of prisoners. Only gradually did it become clear that these practices
extended to the systematic cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment of
prisoners, culminating in some instances in outright torture.116 Major General
110. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (hereinafter "First Geneva Convention");
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces at Sea,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (hereinafter "Second Geneva Convention"); Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (hereinafter "Third Geneva Convention"); Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.T.S. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 973 (hereinafter "Fourth Geneva Convention"); Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247 (hereinafter "Second Hague
Convention"); Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat.
2277, Consol. T.S. 539, 1 Bevans 631 (hereinafter "Fourth Hague Convention"). The Hague Conventions
continue to apply except were superseded by the Geneva Conventions or other treaties. There are also two
protocols to the Geneva Conventions adopted in 1977, which the United States has not signed or ratified.
Additional Protocol I Relating to the Protection of Victims of Armed Conflict, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
3; Additional Protocol 11 Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflict, June
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. Arguably, the Additional Protocols are customary international law. See Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004
I.C.J. No. 130 89, 124; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 610, 617 (Sept. 2, 1998);
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-AR72, Appeal on Jurisdiction, 119, 127 (Oct. 2, 1995).
111. The U.S. Army issued the first codification of the laws of war to achieve wide international
influence. Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, General orders no.
100, art. 16 (Apr. 24, 1863). The General Order was drafted by Francis Lieber, and therefore is referred to
as the "Lieber Code." See David Glazier, Ignorance Is Not Bliss: The Law of Belligerent Occupation and
the U.S. Invasion ofIraq, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 121, 128-48, 151-70 (2005).
112. See, e.g., Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Calley v.
Hoffman, 425 U.S. 911 (1976). See also The War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000).
113. JOHN F. MURPHY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
142-54 (2004).
114. Id. at 312-16.
115. Id. at 154-63, 317-18.
116. See UN Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Civil and Political Rights,
Including the Question of Torture and Detention, Commission on Human Rights, 59th Sess., UN Doc.
E/CN.4/2003/8 (2002) at Prov. Agenda Item 11 (a). See also Diane Marie Amann, Guantanamo, 42 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 263, 319-23, 329-35 (2004); Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but
Defends Interrogations, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, at Al; David Johnston, At a Secret Interrogation,
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Geoffrey Miller was brought from Guantinamo to Iraq to instruct the prison
guards in the "best" ways to interrogate prisoners. '17 And eventually, President
Bush acknowledged that these practices-which he termed an "alternative set
of procedures" for interrogation-were and would, if he had his way, remain
government policy."' Yet the Third Geneva Convention expressly prohibits
torture,119 while all four Geneva Conventions, in common article 3, require that
"persons taking no active part in hostilities, including members of the armed
forces who have laid down their arms" to be treated "humanely," which is
further defined as excluding "murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment
and torture" as well as "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliat-
ing and degrading treatment."' 2° Common article 3 applies to conflicts "not of
an international character." The Supreme Court resolved doubts about the
meaning of the phrase in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 2' holding that the phrase
encompasses all conflicts other than conflicts between nations.
The United States has also ratified the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights ("Civil Rights Covenant"), which prohibits torture'22 and the
Convention against Torture.'23 The Third Geneva Convention, the Civil Rights
Covenant, and the Convention on Torture all forbid derogation from the
Dispute Flared over Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2006, at Al; Shannon Smiley & Craig Whitlock, Turk
Was Abused at Guantanamo, Lawyers Say, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2006, at Al I; Craig S. Smith & Souad
Mekhennet, Algerian Tells of Dark Term in U.S. Hands, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2006, at Al.
117. See Josh White, Top Officer Ordered to Testify on Abuse: Use of Dogs to Scare Detainees at
Issue, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2006, at Al4. See also John Barry et al., The Roots of Torture, NEWSWEEK,
May 24, 2004, at 16; Nathan A. Canestaro, "Small Wars" and the Law: Options for Prosecuting the
Insurgents in Iraq, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 73 (2004); Josh White, Memo Shows Officer's Shift on Use
of Dogs: Abu Ghreib Commander Urged End to Tactic But No Punishment for Guards, WASH. POST, Apr.
15, 2006, at All (describing the testimony of Colonel Thomas Pappas).
118. R. Jeffrey Smith, Bush Says Detainees Will Be Tried: He Confirms the Existence of CIA
Prisons, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2006, at Al. For the full text of the Presidents remarks, see President Bush
Delivers Remarks on Terrorism, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2006/09/06/AR2006090601425.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2006).
119. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 110, at arts. 13, 17, 130.
120. Id. at art. 3. See also First Geneva Convention, supra note 110, at art. 3; Second Geneva
Convention, supra note 110, at art. 3; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 110, at art. 3.
121. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2794-96 (2006). For the underlying debate, see Derek
Jinks, The Applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the "Global War on Terrorism ", 46 VA. J. INT'L L.
165 (2005). See discussion infra notes 142-57.
122. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 at art.
7 (hereinafter "Civil Rights Covenant"). Arguably, the Civil Rights Covenant does not apply to actions by
a state outside its territory. United States v. Duarte-Acero, 296 F.3d 1277, 1283 (11th Cir. 2002). The
international institution responsible for interpreting the document reached the opposite conclusion. General
Comment no. 31, U.N. Human Rights Commission, Mar. 29, 2004, UN Doc. A/59/40, 1:175, 177.
123. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane and Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1985, 1465 U.N.T.S. 65 (hereinafter "Convention against Torture").
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prohibition of torture-unlike other provisions of the Geneva Conventions,
there is no military necessity exception to the ban on torture. 24 The United
States, in ratifying the Civil Rights Covenant, included a reservation that "The
United States considers itself bound by article 7 to the extent that 'cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment' means the cruel and unusual
punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to
the Constitution of the United States.' ' 125 The UN Committee on Human Rights
concluded that the reservation was incompatible with the terms of the Civil
Rights Covenant and therefore is void, although the ratification is valid. 126
Even if that is not correct, can anyone contend that intense and on-going mis-
treatment, even if it does not cause death or severe physical or mental injury,
is not "cruel and unusual punishment" as prohibited by the United States
Constitution? 2
7
The Bybee Memorandum sought to evade these strictures by taking the
position that if interrogation does not involve life-threatening techniques or
serious permanent physical injury ("equivalent to organ failure," or mental
suffering that lasts "months or years"), then there is no torture. This was
translated by U.S. soldiers guarding prisoners into the slogan, "No blood, no
foul.' 129 The practices that resulted from such an attitude range from relatively
mild all the way up to death: deprivation of sleep, food, and water; covering
detainee's heads with hoods; forcing of them to stand in physically stressful
positions; the use of dogs to intimidate and abuse prisoners; "waterboarding";
and the beating or suffocating of prisoners to death. 30
124. Civil Rights Covenant supra note 122, at art. 4(2); Convention against Torture, supra note 123,
at arts. 1(1), 2(2); Third Geneva Convention, supra note 110, at arts. 13, 17, 130.
125. See S. Exec. Rep. No. 101-30, at 29-31 (1990). See also S. Exec. Rep. No. 102-23, at 22
(1992) (reservation for the Civil Rights Covenant). See generally Sean Kevin Thompson, Note, The Legality
of the Use of Psychiatric Neuroimaging in Intelligence Interrogation, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 1601 (2005).
126. U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add. 6,1 18 (1994), reprinted in U.N. Human Rights Comm.
Report, U.N. Doc. A/50/40 (1996); U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 50, 14 (1995) The problem is considered
at length in LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 783-94 (1999).
127. U.S. CONsT. amend. VII. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992) (the use of excessive
physical force may constitute cruel and unusual punishment even if the prisoner does not suffer serious
injury). See generally Seth F. Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack and Screw: Constitutional Restraints on
Torture in the War on Terror, 6 U. PENN. J. CONST. L. 278 (2003).
128. Bybee Memorandum, supra note 6, at 6. See also Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, A Torture
Memo and lts Tortuous Critics, WALL ST. J., July 6,2004, at A22; John Yoo, A Critical Look at Torture Law,
L.A. TIMES, July 6, 2004, at B 11. Cf Cathy Young, Torturing Logic: Is Pulling Fingernails Really Just an
Aggressive Manicure?, REASON, Mar. 1, 2006, at 20.
129. Eric Schmitt & Carolyn Marshall, Task Force 6-26: Inside Camp Nama; In Secret Unit's
Black Room, a Grim Portrait of US. Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2006, § 1, at 1.
130. See generally MARK DANNER, TORTURE & TRUTH: AMERICA, ABU GHREIB, AND THE WAR ON
TERROR (2004); Human Rights Watch, Afghanistan: Impunity for Systematic Abuse (2004), available at
[Vol. 13:1
Dellapenna
Apparently realizing that the argument about the meaning of torture was
weak, the authors of the Bybee memorandum also claimed that the President
has the power to authorize torture notwithstanding applicable conventions and
federal statutes: "Congress may no more regulate the President's ability to
detain and interrogate enemy combatants than it may regulate his ability to
direct troop movements on the battlefield."'' This argument would make the
Uniform Code of Military Justice unconstitutional, despite the Constitution's
vesting in Congress of authority to "make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces." 3' Why the authors of the Bybee
Memorandum chose to do all of this on the authority of the President without
involving Congress and the courts, and over the objections of the lawyers in the
military services and other operational branches of the government, 33 seems all
too clear-these other institutions could not be relied upon to approve the
torture or near torture that the administration wanted to use.
The highly dubious constitutional argument that the President, as chief
executive and commander-in-chief, cannot be restrained in his decisions about
the conduct of military operations has been deployed in defense of indefensible
conduct. As Jeremy Waldron put it, "[t]his is notjust tinkering with the details
of positive law: it amounts to a comprehensive assault on our traditional
understanding of the whole legal regime relating to torture."'3 4 And no legal
legerdemain can explain how the President can order such torture when
Congress has expressly prohibited torture and the nation has ratified treaties
forbidding it. 35 Even if, somehow, one believes these practices are not
http://hrw.org/reports/2004/usa0604/4.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2006); Mark Bowden, The Dark Art of
Interrogation: A Survey of the Landscape ofPersuasion, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 1, 2003, at 56; Douglas
Jehl, Questions Left by C.IA. Chief on Torture Use, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2005, at A]; Mahvish Khan, My
Guantanamo Diary: Face to Face with the War on Terrorism, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 2006, at B 1; Neil A.
Lewis, Fresh Details Emerge on Harsh Methods at Guanidnamo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2005, at A] 1; Miles
Moffeit, Brutal Interrogations in Iraq: Five Detainee's Deaths Probed, DENV. POST, May 19, 2004, at Al;
Schmitt & Marshall, supra note 129; Adam Zagorin & Michael Duffy, Inside the Interrogation of Detainee
063, TIME, June 20, 2005, at 26.
131. Bybee Memorandum, supra note 6, at 39.
132. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
133. See Tim Golden, Senior Lawyer at Pentagon Broke Ranks on Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20,
2006, at A8; Carol Rosenberg, Miami Lawyer Fought against Detainee Abuse: A Once-Secret Memo Shows
How a Top Navy Lawyer Fought to RescindDefense Department Interrogation Techniques at Guantdnamo,
MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 21, 2006, at A3; Josh White, FBI Interrogators in Cuba Opposed Aggressive Tactics,
WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 2006, at Al 6; Josh White, Military Lawyers Say Tactics Broke Rules, WASH. POST,
Mar. 16, 2006, at A13; Josh White, Tough Interrogation Tactics Were Opposed: Pentagon Task Force Was
Told Not to Use Techniques Approved in 2002, Records Show, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2006, at Al 6.
134. Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 COLUM.
L. REV. 1681, 1709 (2005).
135. Cass R. Sunstein, National Security, Liberty, andthe D. C. Circuit, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 693,
696-704 (2005). See also Jinks & Sloss, supra note 5.
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torture,'36 Congress has now enacted the Detainee Treatment Act to ban cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment.'37 Since January 1, 2006, there really is no
room for argument that the international standards do not apply in full. Yet
President Bush responded with a "signing statement" in signing the bill in
which he insisted that nothing in this law impaired his powers as commander-
in-chief to do whatever is necessary to protect the country. 
1 38
V. THE DENOUEMENT, PERHAPS
The other branches of government long deferred to the Presidential
assertions of authority, contrary to the expectations of the framers of the
Constitution. 3' But, just as lawyers played key roles in preparing documents
purporting to justify the various policies instituted on the sole authority of the
President, 40 lawyers also challenged the various policies from the beginning-
often acting as pro bono (unpaid) volunteers in defense of the rule of law.
Eventually, several of these cases reached the Supreme Court of the United
States. 4 1 While the Court consistently ruled against the government in these
cases, the Court always ruled on narrow grounds that did not address the
questions of whether the President was exceeding his constitutional powers
until the Court decided the case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 42 in 2006.
Hamdan involved the prosecution of a former chauffeur for Osama bin
Laden for various war crimes. The prosecution was to be before a military
commission created by executive order consistent neither with normal civilian
(Article III) courts nor with normal military courts (Courts Martial).'43 The
136. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, With All Necessary Force, L.A. TIMES, June 11, 2004, at 13 ("the U.S.
is not required to treat captured terrorists as if they were guests at a hotel or suspects held at an American
police station").
137. Detainee Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000dd (2006)).
138. Editorial, Bush's "Signing" Bonus: He Issues Himself an Out on Torture, NEWSDAY (Nassau
County, NY), Jan. 8, 2006, at A32; David Sarasohn, Presidential Powers: Congress Writes a Law, Then
President Rereads It, THE OREGONIAN, Jan. 4, 2006, at B8; Tortured Language: President Bush Signs a
Statement that Indicates Prisoner Abuse Might Well Continue, ALB. TIMES UN., Jan. 16, 2006, at A6. On
signing statements generally, see AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING
STATEMENTS, RECOMMENDATION (2006), available at http://www.abanet.orglop/signingstatements/aba_
final-signing_ statementsrecommendation-report 7-24--06.pdf.
139. See the text accompanied in supra.
140. See the authorities collected supra note 6.
141. See generally Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749; Padilla v. Hanfi, 126 S. Ct. 1649 (2006); Hamdi, 542
U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
142. See generally Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749.
143. Military Order on the Detention, Treatment, and Trail of Certain Non-Citizens in the War on
Terrorrism issued by George W. Bush, Nov. 13,2001,66 FED. REG. 222 (codified at 3 CFR 918 (2002)). See
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Court, by a vote of 5-3 (with the Chief Justice, who had voted in favor of the
government in the case at the Court of Appeals level,'" recusing himself) held
that the President lacks authority to create such a tribunal in the face of valid
statutes limiting the types of courts and procedures to be used in such trials. 45
The Court, in an opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens, held that mere
emergency ("exigency alone") does notjustify the creation of "penal tribunals"
that are not authorized by Act of Congress or the Constitution itself'46 and went
on to reaffirm the most central holding of Ex parte Milligan: '47 The President's
job is to enforce the law, not to make whatever laws he likes in disregard of
binding Acts of Congress or valid treaties.'48 The Court then carefully
examined the procedures provided for the proposed military commissions and
found that those procedures violated both the Uniform Code of Military Justice
and the four Geneva Conventions. 14 Justice Anthony Kennedy declined to join
some other parts of the majority opinion, but concurred in all of the points just
discussed. 50 Justices Samuel Alito, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas
dissented on a range of points in opinions written by Scalia and Thomas.
Justice Scalia focused primarily on whether the Court had the authority to
review Hamdan's appeal at all,' 5' while Justice Thomas wrote an impassioned
defense of the President's power to command the military without let or
hindrance from the court. 15
2
Justice Stevens' opinion was long, technical, and narrow, perhaps in order
to avoid the risks of appearing to be too "activist" in a case where the future
safety or even survival of the nation might be at risk. 153 Still Justice Stevens'
opinion made the point that the President could not proceed without
Congressional authorization."' The opinion also confined itself to the question
generally Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 2127-33.
144. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
145. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2772-75.
146. Id. at 2773.
147. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2(4 Wall. 2), 139-40 (1866).
148. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2773-74.
149. Id. at 2786-96. See Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801 to 946 (2000). The
four Geneva Conventions are collected at supra note 110. The Court focused particularly on 10 U.S.C. §§
821,836.
150. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2799-2809.
151. Id. at 2809-22 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 2823-55 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
153. Cf Sunstein, supra note 66 (arguing that the American legal tradition of deciding cases on
non-constitutional grounds when possible allows courts a ready excuse for not confronting the executive
branch in such cases).
154. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2772-75.
2006]
46 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
of the use of the presidentially created military commissions to try persons
accused of crimes, and did not mention, even in passing, the numerous other
Presidential assertions of unilateral authority to defend the nation. While the
implications of the decision for these other assertions of authority seemed clear
enough, the Bush administration insists that the decision applies only to the
military commission question. 155
Has the President learned anything from his errors? It seems not. As of
this writing, the President and a newly aroused Senate are locked in disagree-
ment over whether to enact a statute authorizing the procedures disapproved in
Hamdan'56-secret trials, denying a defendant access to some of the evidence,
with hearsay entered into evidence, and without confrontation of the
witnesses.'57 The President is even more adamant about modifying other
unilateral policies that at the least intrude upon the responsibilities of Congress,
some of which are arguably illegal."5 8
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Disclosure of these practices had disastrous effects for the global image
of the United States. From the near unanimous support for the United States
after the September 1 1th attacks,5 9 the Bush Administration managed in only
155. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Justices Tacitly Backed the Use of Guantanamo, Bush Says, N.Y. TIMES,
July 8, 2006, at A14.
156. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2785-92.
157. Charles Babington & Jonathan Weisman, Senators Defy Bush on Terror Measure: Panel Backs
Rival Bill on Interrogations, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2006, at Al; Charles Babington & R. Jeffrey Smith,
Bush 's Detainee Plan Is Criticized: Military Laywers and Senators Say Proposed Rules for Evidence Are
Unfair, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2006, at A9; David S. Cloud & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, White House Bill Provides
System to Try Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2006, at Al; David E. Sanger, For Congress, 2 Votes Loom,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2006, at Al; Kate Zemike, Lawyers and G.O.P. Chiefs Resist Proposal on Tribunal,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2006, at Al ; Kate Zemike, Rebufffor Bush on Terror Trials in a Senate Test, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2006, at Al; Kate Zemike &Neil A. Lewis, Proposal for New Tribunalsfor Terror Suspects
Would Hew to the First Series, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2006, at A27.
158. See generally American Civil Liberties Union v. National Security Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d
754 (E.D. Mich. 2006). See also Nina Bernstein, Court Orders US. to Allay 9/11 Spy Fears, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 8,2006, at B5; Anna Johnson, Bar Association Attacks Bush over Surveillance, BUFF. NEWS, Feb. 14,
2006, at A5; Carol D. Leonnig & Dafna Linzer, Judge Quits Spying Court in Protest over President's Policy,
WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2005, at AI; Eric Lichtblau, Judges on Secretive Panel Speak out on Spy Program,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29,2006, at Al 9; Hope Yen, Specter: Spying Program Broke Law, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb.
6, 2006, at Al. On the present state of proposed legislation, see Sanger, supra note 157.
159. Most famously expressed on the front page of France's most influential newspaper: "Nous
sommes tous americains." LE MONDE, Sept. 12, 2001, at 1. See generally MURPHY, supra note 113, at
167-68; Jack M. Beard, America's New War on Terror: The Case for Self-Defense under International
Law, 25 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 669,568-73 (2002); Berta E. Hemandez-Truyol, Globalizing Terror, 81
OR. L. REv. 941, 945-50 (2002).
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three years to make the United States an international pariah. 60 The image of
the United States-one of our more important assets during the Cold War-has
only gotten worse since. 16 1 And we pay a predictable price, as when the
Chinese officials dismiss criticism of their violations of human rights with the
response that "they have no lessons to learn from an administration that
produced the abuses at Abu Ghreib prison in Iraq and detainment centers in
Guantinamo Bay, Cuba, Afghanistan, and elsewhere."' 162
The domestic consequences these asserted powers are no less momentous.
The various actions constitute a pattern-a plan even 163 -of asserting
Presidential authority to act unilaterally, regardless of the authority or decisions
of the other branches of government. The Pentagon, moreover, has announced
plans for a "long war"--one that would last decades. " The nature of the war
made by terrorists makes it difficult to sort combatants from civilians, to
identify "enemy aliens," to determine whether someone is captured on a
battlefield or elsewhere, or even to determine whether the enemy has been
defeated and the war is at an end. 165 All this makes arguments about the need
to set aside the usual rules for the duration of the emergency even more
alarming. 66
160. See MURPHY, supra note 113, at 169-77; Madeleine K. Albright, Endangered Friendships:
Bush's Policies and Practices Drive a Wedge between the US. and Key Allies in Europe, BALT. SUN, Jan.
4,2004, at 1 C; Ben Barber, May a Good Year Be Sealed, 19 THE WORLD & 1, at 158 (2004); Marcus Noland,
Why Bush Is on Course to Lose Both Koreas, FINANCIAL TIMES (UK), Jan. 23, 2004, at 23; John Vinocur,
Criticism of US. Obscures Growing Disunity on the Continent: What Does Europe Want?/Rhetoric and
Reality, INT'L HERALD TRiB., Jan. 20, 2004, at 2.
161. See, e.g., Raymond Bonner & Donald Greenlees, Australians View US. as Threat to Peace:
America Lags behind Japan and China in Popularity, Poll Finds, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 29, 2005, at
1; Alan Cowell, A New Survey Suggests that Britons Take a Dim View of the US., N.Y. TIMES, July 3,2006,
at A5; Ian Fisher, Pope Condemns Both Terror and Violations of Geneva Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2005,
at A8; Warren Hoge, Annan Defends UN. Official Who Chided US., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9,2005, at A6; Edith
Lederer, Close Terror Camp: Annan, THE ADVERTISER(Australia.), Feb. 18, 2006, at 73; Colum Lynch, UN.
Official Faults US. Detention: Terrorism Fight Hurts Torture Ban, Human Rights Chief Says, WASH. POST,
Dec. 8, 2005, at A27; Monte Reel & Michael A. Fletcher, Anti-U.S. Protests Flare at Summit: As Bush
Meets Allies in Argentina, Rally Led by Chavez Turns Violent, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2005, at Al; Larry
Rohter & Elisabeth Bumiller, Hemisphere Summit Marredby ViolentAnti-Bush Protests. N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
5,2005, at Al.
162. Edward Cody, Chinese Leader Coming to US. Well Prepared: Planning Reflects Priority on
Relations, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 2006, at At4.
163. See the authorities collected supra notes 7, 8.
164. Ann Scott Tyson, Ability to Wage "Long War" Is Key to Pentagon Plan: Conventional Tactics
De-Emphasized, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2006, at A 1; Ann Scott Tyson, New Plans Foresee Fighting Terrorism
beyond War Zones: Pentagon to Rely on Special Operations, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 2006, at Al. See
generally Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 2123-27; Brooks, supra note 102, at 725-28.
165. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 2048-49.
166. See Lobel, supra note 105.
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This pattern of arrogation of power should alarm any unbiased observer.
As Bill Keller, Executive Editor of the New York Times, stated recently, "I
don't know how far action will follow rhetoric, but some days it sounds like the
administration is declaring war at home on the values it professes to be
promoting abroad."' 67 Justice David Souter, in his concurring opinion in Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, expressed what ought to be the national attitude:
In a government of separated powers, deciding finally on what is a
reasonable degree of guaranteed liberty whether in peace or in war (or
some condition in between) is not well entrusted to the Executive
Branch of Government, whose particular responsibility is to maintain
security. For reasons of inescapable human nature, the branch of the
Government asked to counter a serious threat is not the branch on
which to rest the Nation's entire reliance on striking the balance
between the will to win and the cost in liberty on the way to victory;
the responsibility for security will naturally amplify the claim that
security legitimately raises.'68
Justice Souter's analysis might be considered prudential, yet his analysis
points to something more basic, as Justice Robert Jackson pointed out more
than 50 years ago in Youngstown Sheet and Tube:69 The President's power to
act unilaterally is strictly limited by the Constitution and by valid treaties and
acts of Congress. Constraints on the unilateral authority of the President are
among the most central safeguards of our liberties. Have the terrorists
succeeded in making it impossible for us to uphold those limitations? Or are
we just afraid to take reasonable risks in order to uphold our ideals?
167. Dan Eggan, Administration Targets Journalists, Government Sources, WASH. POST, Mar. 4,
2006, at Al. See also Eugene Robinson, "Values " We Have to Hide Abroad, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2006,
at A17.
168. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 545 (Souter, J., concurring).
169. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-40, 653 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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